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Despite the high level of interest in the role of governments in building national infor-
mation infrastructure (NII) as a source of competitive advantage, it is still not clear how
major information technology initiatives can help leverage national economies into the
global marketplace. In light of the recent rollout of one of the world’s largest electronic
commerce initiatives, we examine the role of private–public partnerships in the suc-
cess of such initiative in Hong Kong. Furthermore, we trace the 3 stages of the pro-
ject—development, implementation, and competitive entrenchment—to identify the
difficulties and challenges encountered and how these were overcome. By drawing
some comparisons with the Singapore approach, we identify the kind of government
involvement appropriate to spur on national competitiveness. We show that in build-
ing the NII, the dual aspects of private-sector leadership and government involvement
are mutually reinforcing. Government intervention is necessary in creating the initial
supply push, whereas the demand pull engendered by the market is critical for lever-
aging the NII as a platform for national competitiveness. The ramification of the study
for other countries is discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the past decade, much attention in information technology (IT)
and government policy research have concentrated on various government initia-
tives to implement national information infrastructures (NII; e.g., [1–9]). The main
focus of attention has been the behavior of governments in NII development pro-
jects, be they piecemeal or coherent. The general consensus is that IT will form the
platform for competing in the global economy of the future [10]. In particular, elec-
tronic commerce (e-commerce) is seen as a significant change agent in transforming
the basis for competition between organizations, industries, and economies. As
such, how well economies build their IT platform will determine their ability to
compete in today’s network economy [11]. In recent years, governments have in-
creasingly become aware that their actions can have a profound impact on the na-
tions’ potentials for doing business electronically. Conversely, they realize that
their actions can also inhibit the diffusion in the use of e-commerce and IT [12].
Countries such as Singapore are often quoted as examples where the government
has taken an active participatory role in national computerization and
informatization [13–16]. The vision for the economy’s NII, its strategies and imple-
mentation initiatives, have all been lead by the government [8]. At the other extreme
of the spectrum are nations such as New Zealand. Although laissez-faire policies
have promoted New Zealand to become a heavy user of IT, ranking second behind
Australia in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of IT spending as a percentage of gross
national product, the cracks have started to appear in its infrastructure [6]. In an in-
ternational environment where countries are rapidly devising explicit strategies to
improve their infrastructure, even the New Zealand government questioned
whether some form of government support was in order. Then there are nations
such as Australia, whose IT policies have been described as falling in between the
two extremes of laissez-faire and strong government interventionism [17]. This ap-
proach has lead to fragmented and uncoordinated policies.
Although there is recognition that some degree of government intervention or
involvement is necessary, the extent to which the private sector should be a formal
part of the policy-making process remains an issue for debate. Should govern-
ments intervene or should the private sector take the lead? Arguably, IT now has
economic, social, and political significance in national policy and governments
have a role to play in ensuring that local industry is part of mainstream develop-
ments. Both private and public sectors have interrelated and mutually reinforcing
goals to achieve through the NII. Yet the balance to be achieved remains a subject of
contention. In the United States, for example, the evolution of the NII has been
shaped mainly by very large private sector firms whose primary interest is in com-
petitive positioning rather than any attempt to build a unified and coherent NII [2].
Meanwhile, developing nations in the Asia-Pacific region are anticipating that
IT-related government initiatives will be a key to economic growth and a spring-
board to leverage them into the global arena [5]. IT adoption among government
bodies is seen as a starting point for encouraging nationwide IT adoption and use,
and for demonstrating efficiency and effectiveness.
In this article, we attempt to build on previous research and to generate a model
for effective government involvement in the diffusion of a community-wide
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e-commerce project through the 3 stages of development, implementation, and
competitive entrenchment. In the analysis that follows, we consider the public–pri-
vate partnership at the initial conception, development, implementation, and en-
trenchment stages of Hong Kong’s electronic trading system. Particular reference
is made to the needs of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and institu-
tional involvement in promoting adoption [18–20]. We then discuss the impact of
the new system on the Hong Kong government, subscribers to Tradelink services,
and Tradelink itself. We make a comparison with the Singapore electronic trading
system development and implementation project. Finally, we draw conclusions
from this research to identify the appropriateness of government involvement in
projects of this nature.
2. THE CASE OF TRADELINK ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Within the broader context of the NII, the focus of this study was on one (but criti-
cally important) segment of such developments, that of the trading community in
Hong Kong. Hong Kong has historically been a center of trading and a gateway to
the Far East. With minimal natural resources, the onetime British colony has thrived
on its dependency on export and re-export trading [7, 21]. However, rapid eco-
nomic growth and inflation through the 1970s and 1980s made Hong Kong an in-
creasingly expensive place in which to transact business. At the same time, other
neighboring countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, were making sig-
nificant inroads as global trading hubs. Hong Kong’s competitiveness was eroding
and the laissez-faire principles for which Hong Kong had been known for came un-
der challenge.
This impetus gave rise to the implementation of the world’s largest busi-
ness-to-business (B2B) e-commerce project: largest in terms of size of the potential
number of users and in terms of the number of electronic security keys in issue. The
implementation of such a massive project was handled by Tradelink Electronic
Commerce, a company formed by 10 major business organizations together with
the Hong Kong government as a 10% initial stakeholder. Tradelink, operated un-
der a franchise agreement with the Hong Kong government, was established for
the purpose of “contributing towards an improvement in Hong Kong’s competi-
tiveness in world markets by simplifying trade procedures through the introduc-
tion of new and improved business practices and the use of information
technology” ([22], p. 1). The uniqueness of the Tradelink project makes it a model of
public–private cooperation [3]. In the broader picture, however, Tradelink was to
play a pivotal role in building Hong Kong’s NII, starting with the application of
electronic document transfer technology to government-related trade documents.
The primary task of the company was to transfer all government-related trade
documents from paper submission format to electronic submission format by the
end of March 2000. The unprecedented target of bringing on board around 62,000
traders before then seemed immense. However, its success would ensure that
Hong Kong would have the critical mass to form a springboard for further e-com-
merce initiatives, thus projecting Hong Kong’s competitive advantage over other
trading nations in the region.
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2.1 Starting on the Right Footing
In 1984, the business community of Hong Kong was alerted to the importance of
building a community-wide electronic data interchange (EDI) network and antic-
ipated that EDI would improve the British colony’s trading activities. However,
initially the government was of the opinion that because the private sector would
be the beneficiaries to the EDI project, it should be financed by the private sector.
Conversely, the private sector felt that the government was the only independent
body that could ensure that the project would be administered fairly for the ben-
efit of all users with a long-term perspective. Hence, interest in the project slowly
waned [23].
At around the same time, Hong Kong was transforming from a manufactur-
ing-based economy to a knowledge intensive coordination center [24]. EDI and
e-commerce were seen as the key to reinforcing these changes. With the United Na-
tions’ announcement of the introduction of EDIFACT, it became clear to many
trade service providers that community-wide application of EDI would be an im-
portant factor in maintaining Hong Kong’s future competitiveness.
In April 1988, under the pressures of prominent private-sector organizations
such as China Resources, Hong Kong Air Cargo Terminals, Hongkong and Shang-
hai Banking Corporation, and Maersk Hong Kong, the government broke from its
traditional laissez-faire stance. It announced its intentions to fund, together with
the private sector, a HK$6 million ($770,000) consultancy assignment, whereby the
government acquired a 10% stake in Tradelink, the company set up to manage the
private sector funding.
2.2 Development Stage
Tradelink and the government embarked on the search, planning, and design of a
solution that was to have long-term implications for the company and for Hong
Kong’s national competitiveness.
Tradelink’s organizers believed that a community-wide approach to the project
required participation by government documentation services if it was to succeed.
This would provide the necessary stimulus for rapid adoption of EDI. In the past, a
totally competitive environment provided little incentive for the development of a
national approach. Both the government and the private sector felt that the cooper-
ation required from both sides would best be achieved by the granting of an exclu-
sive franchise for the development of government documentation services,
including a single interface between government, EDI and virtual access network
suppliers, and the trading community. It was argued that such exclusivity would
speed the development of the community facilities, with a fully competitive mar-
ket flourishing around it.
In November 1992, Tradelink entered into an agreement with the government to
provide exclusive EDI services for government trade transactions. The agreement
set out certain controls, such as the regulated return for shareholders and the gov-
ernment’s control on the prices that Tradelink could charge customers. The gov-
ernment also agreed to take up a 30% stake in Tradelink, making it the largest
single shareholder. This agreement sealed the commitment of the Hong Kong gov-
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ernment to back and participate in the implementation of the Community Elec-
tronic Trading Service (CETS).
An operating agreement was signed in March 1994 and the government’s
shareholding increased to 48%. Effectively, the agreement established Tradelink’s
major customer: the government. It determined the operation of CETS, service lev-
els, transactions to be handled, and operating procedures between the two parties.
The agreement also set a mark for when the 7-year franchise should start, which
was to be the date when the first Tradelink service was to be launched.
By 1996, the project was 2 years behind schedule and the company had run into
financial difficulties. As the government was convinced of the strategic importance
of e-commerce in embracing Hong Kong’s competitiveness, it injected an addi-
tional HK$425 million ($54.6 million) into Tradelink in the form of a loan. The re-
search, planning, and development stage took nearly 10 years.
2.3 Implementation Stage
In 1997, Tradelink launched its first e-commerce services, SilkNet and ValuNet.
These services were to help the trading community deal with trade documentation
more efficiently through the use of an office computer, with fees collected electroni-
cally. Users could also receive daily, up-to-date statements of their quota balance
and Trade Department notices to exporters by e-mail. Further services were added
later, such as issuing of certificates of origin and carrier notifications.
Two major issues needed to be addressed to minimize resistance to adoption and
promote demand pull: creating a standard for the written form of the Chinese lan-
guage and developing a secure infrastructure to prevent unauthorized access to the
system. The launch of the bilingual (Chinese–English) trade declaration in March
1999 boosted adoption rates. Despite the British legacy, Hong Kong fundamentally
usedChineseas thebusinessmedium.ThiswasthefirstChinese languageEDIdocu-
ment to be introduced in the world. The government stipulated that documents
could only be submitted in English or in the traditional Chinese character format.
Security was another major issue for users and a critical factor in their consider-
ation of whether to adopt the new system. To address this, Tradelink developed a
security module based on the public–private key infrastructure (PKI). The applica-
tion of such a security module to a user base as large as Tradelink’s was unprece-
dented. Tradelink played a significant role in bringing to the attention of the
government the importance of having an appropriate legal regulatory framework
to ensure users’ confidence in e-commerce. The establishment of a certification au-
thority became a cornerstone to that framework. Within that framework, Tradelink
laid down stringent requirements relating to identification and authentication of
documents through a proven public key security module. In December 2000 there
were approximately 150,000 keys in issue, making the Tradelink system easily the
largest e-commerce system in the Asia-Pacific region, if not the world. The govern-
ment endorsed Tradelink’s PKI even before its announcement that the Hongkong
Post would be appointed the public certification authority at the end of 1998.
Other issues affecting adoption required attention and planning at the imple-
mentation stage. Of particular concern was the fact that over 90% of Hong Kong’s
traders were SMEs with little or no experience in, or knowledge of, computer tech-
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nology. Most of Hong Kong’s traders were involved in outward processing trade.
Although they might employ very few staff in Hong Kong, some had manufactur-
ing operations in China. They were mainly family run and adopted the traditional
way of doing business, being too comfortable and reluctant to change. Their atti-
tude hindered the adoption of e-commerce. Hence, the government stressed the
significance of the provision of acceptable solutions to provide EDI services to non-
users of computers before it would agree to a schedule for closing government doc-
ument collection counters. A hub-and-spokes structure was designed to
accommodate the large majority of SMEs whose trading volumes were small. The
service centers acted as spokes to help noncomputerized traders in Hong Kong en-
joy the many efficiency and productivity benefits of e-commerce. The service cen-
ters would validate the details on paper documents, convert the data to EDI format,
then forward the documents electronically to the government.
The general population lacked awareness and appreciation of what e-commerce
was and the role that it could play in the business community. In addition to trade
exhibitions and television advertisements to promote Tradelink’s cause, the com-
pany negotiated with a number of vocational teaching establishments to incorpo-
rate training in the use of Tradelink products into their curriculum. A customer
service hotline was established to provide service from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., 7 days a
week, to deal with queries and problems users had.
Tradelink and the government worked together to ensure that the barriers to
adoption would be minimized. Having accomplished a workable infrastructure,
the cutoff dates set by the government for the closing of paper applications coun-
ters for quota licenses by the end of 1998 and trade declarations by the end of
March 2000 seemed realistic and achievable. Thereafter, all documents were to be
submitted electronically. The closure of government counters was seen as crucial
for Tradelink to succeed. Making adoption compulsory was the only means to
achieve the “critical mass” needed to ensure low cost transactions.
In addition, a strong customer service team that was responsive to customer en-
quiries and problems was one of the deciding factors for many SMEs. On a typical
day, the company’s hotline received between 3,500 to 4,000 calls. Many of the calls
from SMEs were to deal with simple technical problems, oftentimes not directly as-
sociated with Tradelink’s service applications. Frequently, technicians were re-
quired to make on-site visits to ensure efficiency in resolving user problems.
Tradelink also worked with the government to ensure that costs for SMEs
would be kept to a minimum. Software was offered free of charge. Annual fees and
first time registration fees had been reduced. From time to time, the company of-
fered very significant incentive programs to attract the SMEs. For example, during
the first months of the launch of the certificate of origin applications service, users
needed only to pay the government fee, not the Tradelink service charge. In the
first 2 years of the trade declaration electronic service, Tradelink operated a “Week-
end Program,” which meant that documents could be submitted on weekends at
the rate of HK$2.00 per documents as opposed to the normal HK$11.90 per docu-
ment. A comparison of user costs based on paper submissions and electronic sub-
missions is shown in Table 1.
The Internet-based versions of SilkNet and ValuNet were introduced with the
launch of the Web site, www.tradelink.com.hk, in February 2000. This enabled
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Tradelink to have tailor-made information for individual user companies by pro-
viding information, such as a daily update of the quota balance from the Trade De-
partment, through the Internet. The age of Internet commerce provides a new
medium through which companies can get closer to their customers. To compete
successfully, companies need to be agile to respond to the ever-increasing and
ever-changing needs of customers. Many leaders in Internet commerce have re-
ported significant volumes of sales through the Internet placed by SMEs [25]. For
the Hong Kong environment with its unusually large number of SMEs, an Internet
based EDI/e-commerce infrastructure would be well received. Basic customer ser-
vice and technical support functions provided online would help to lower service
and support costs. Speed-to-market would be a competitive advantage for Hong
Kong based companies whose trade cycles would be significantly shortened. The
potentials for a fully integrated value chain would be immense. Vertical integra-
tion with global and national e-commerce service providers in the supply chain
would improve efficiency and generate benefits for all parties.
In 1999, Tradelink began to see profits. Tradelink handled 544,373 export li-
censes for restrained textiles and 15,614,906 trade declarations in 2000. This trans-
lates to 92% of all government trade document submissions, whereas the
remaining 8% go through the service centers. By 2000, the company showed profits
of HK$100 million on revenue of HK$229 million. Of the HK$425 million loan from
the government, Tradelink used only HK$203 million. By September 2000, the
company had paid off all of its loans. By February 2001, the company had success-
fully subscribed over 51,000 users, which represents about 80% of the shrunk trad-
ing community of Hong Kong that has been shaken by the Asian economic crisis in
the late 1990s.
2.4 Competitive Entrenchment Stage
For Tradelink, the sociotechnical web is founded on its customer base. Up until
the end of 1998, there was no proper institutional mechanism in Hong Kong to
extend e-commerce/EDI services beyond what had been agreed to between the
government and Tradelink, thus presenting very limited value-added service.
With the introduction of the carrier notification service in early 1998, a number of
freight forwarders and carriers, such as airlines and shipping lines, were brought
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Table 1
User Costs of Submitting Government Related Trade Documents
Charge
Service









license application December 31, 1998 216 141 75 216
Trade declaration March 31, 2000 13 0.5 11.9 12.4
Production notification February 27, 2000 49 34 15 49
Certificate of origin September 24, 2000 110 95 15 110
aGiven in Hong Kong dollars, HK$7.80 = $1.00.
on board. Indeed, Tradelink estimated that it had captured around 70% to 80% of
the freight forwarding market. As Tradelink embarked on a strategy of
interconnectivity with other e-commerce service providers, its network became
of greater value to its user base.
Tradelink realized at an early stage that it would be impossible for the company to
tackle the challenge of applying e-commerce to the whole trade cycle effectively on
its own. Instead, the approach would be to establish a network of strategic alliances
with value-added network service operators and other trade service providers.
Tradelink embarked on a mission to shape a community-wide e-commerce infra-
structure that would enhance the overall efficiency of the independent, indus-
try-based networks that flourished through the 1990s. Figure 1 shows the new
ecosystem that it is building through the formation of alliances and partnerships
with local and regional organ.izations. The broader range of services now offered
through Tradelink are discussed following. As a result of these alliances and joint
ventures, Tradelink is pulling together the various players in the trading cycle.
2.4.1 Arena Transportation. In 1999, Tradelink underwent a pilot project with
Arena Transportation Community Network, a company that provided electronic
access to all parties involved in trading [26]. Through the Arena Web interface, it
was possible to create a complete set of trade documents, send and receive them
from a trading partner as well as easily manage all documents related to current
and past business activities. It was hoped that by interconnecting with Arena,
Tradelink would extend the service offering to its users.
2.4.2 Traxon Asia. The next project to undergo pilot testing was an alliance
project with Traxon Asia. Traxon operated an international electronic network for
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Figure 1. Tradelink’s role as an e-commerce magnet in international trade transactions. ECIC =
Export Credit Insurance Corporation; * = confirmed development schedule (with govern-
ment/other service providers); ** = under scoping/consideration; # = TradeCard services.
coordinating transactions between freight forwarders, air cargo terminals, and air-
lines. Its objective was to provide e-commerce services to the air cargo industry.
Traxon was very successful and by 1998, 94% of air cargo volume lifted out of Hong
Kong was coordinated by Traxon [27]. The alliance with Traxon would allow
Traxon’s subscribers to use Tradelink’s services and vice versa.
2.4.3 CIECC. In September 1999, Tradelink signed an agreement with the
China International Electronic Commerce Center (CIECC), an organization formed
with the intention of providing e-commerce services to China such as quota licens-
ing and certificate of origin issuing services. The agreement marked the com-
mencement of the testing phase of interconnectivity between Tradelink’s system
with that of CIECC’s. Once interconnectivity was established, CIECC was able to
provide access to Tradelink’s services for its customers in Hong Kong.
2.4.4 TradeCard. TradeCard (www.tradecard.com), a B2B, e-commerce trans-
action enabler focused specifically on cross-border trade, was conceived as a new
payment alternative for international trade [28]. It provided a solution that was
easier to use than a letter of credit, more secure than open accounts, and available
for one flat fee per settled transaction. TradeCard’s aim was to increase the volume
of cross-border trade and lower the cost of transactions.
In March 2000, TradeCard announced its worldwide service launch in Hong
Kong, in partnership with Tradelink. The latter agreed to develop a direct market-
ing program to promote TradeCard as a new international trade settlement tool to
the Hong Kong trading community. In addition, TradeCard provided a call center
for TradeCard customers. The partnership did not require additional headcount
for Tradelink. The revenue generated from the patnership (30% of the TradeCard
transaction fee) was sufficient to offset the operating costs.
2.4.5 C&T. The Hong Kong government awarded Computer And Technol-
ogies Holdings (C&T) a contract to build and operate an electronic tendering sys-
tem that was launched in April 2000. Later in the year, C&T was keen to extend the
system to commercial use and approached Tradelink to tap into its large customer
base. Tradelink saw this as an additional service for its subscribers. Furthermore,
Tradelink’s digital certification system enabled users to enter a tendering process
within legal and secure parameters.
2.4.6 Asia E-Commerce Alliance. In June 2000, Tradelink initiated talks with
Taiwan’s TradeVan and Singapore’s Singapore Network Services (SNS) to form
the Asia E-Commerce Alliance. The intention was for all parties to add strength to
their individual networks and to add value to customers. By the end of 2000, the Al-
liance had 5 members: Tradelink, TradeVan, SNS, KTNet (Korean) and CIECC. The
sixth member was likely to be from Japan. Initially, the Alliance focused on 3 main
projects with the following aims:
• To facilitate cross-border transactions by promoting intraregional trading. In
early 2001, tests were already underway for electronic transmission of commercial
invoices, packing lists, and a host of other documentation.
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• To address the security issue through creating a mutual recognition of digital
certificates such that, for example, a Hong Kong trader using a Tradelink digital
signature would be recognized and accepted by a trader in Taiwan. Recognition
implied that there be sufficient legal status for all parties concerned to base their
commercial activities on. With variances in the degree of recognition among the
certification authorities’ operations of the 5 areas, adjustments and compromises
had to be made. One way to overcome these differences was to set a common stan-
dard, the lowest common standard acceptable to all 5 parties. This would entail the
formation of a policy authority that would delve into the individual policies em-
ployed in each member country.
• To create a pan-Asia portal. The initial idea was to form a database of com-
pany profiles and products offered. Free Web hosting services were a possibility, as
this would allow customers to display their company and product information on
the portal. This would create a very sizable market in which traders wishing to buy
or sell in the region would be able to search and access corporate information. The
next step in building this B2B platform would be to link with similar portals in Eu-
rope and the United States. The Alliance hoped that the portal would attract large
buyers such as General Electric to create initial and sustained user value.
Being the initiator of the Alliance, Tradelink played a leading role in the direc-
tion of the Alliance. Tradelink anticipated that the success of the 3 initial projects,
which should see results by early 2002, would demonstrate a very powerful and
formidable alliance.
Undoubtedly, Tradelink’s most valuable asset is its user base and the electronic
network that brings all parties in the trading network together. It is no wonder that
many organizations are keen to partner with Tradelink to tap into those assets.
However, the company maintains strict criteria for entering into an alliance or part-
nership. At the minimum, it has to ensure that the additional services create value
for its users.
Moving beyond the core services of government trade document submissions,
Tradelink aims to build a B2B platform that addresses services along the whole
supply chain, including the order fulfillment process, validations, production,
settlement, logistics, and so on. Figure 2 shows a typical example of the parties
involved in an export process along with the trade documentation that are cur-
rently under development or are now delivered electronically by Tradelink’s net-
work.
The dependence on government documentation as a source of revenue is likely
to diminish over time. Future alliances and partnerships would focus on those pro-
cesses and services along the supply chain. With these developments, Tradelink
had to strengthen its business development team to grasp business opportunities
as they arose
2.5 Impact
Various government departments and subscribers have realized substantial bene-
fits in using Tradelink’s services. Within the affected government departments,
294 FARHOOMAND, NG, YUE
Figure 2 (Continued).
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business process reengineering and systems integration took place. For example,
the Trade Department’s export license function saw a substantial trimming down of
its license processing section and the savings amounted to HK$16 million (over $2
million) per annum. When trade declarations were fully transferred to electronic,
further substantial savings were realized. In 1997, the government estimated that
the economic benefits could amount to HK$8.6 billion ($1.1 billion) a year when EDI
would be widely adopted in Hong Kong for handling all transport, commercial,
and financial transactions. For the government alone, realizable staff savings of 256
posts by 2000 were mentioned [29]. A further saving of 308 posts could also be
achieved through avoiding staff increases required to cope with the growth in
workload anticipated.
Electronic document submissions cost the users no more than before. Apart
from the initial capital cost for computer hardware and software, the government
passes its savings back to users by way of reduced government charges. In 1998,
the government raised the minimum cost of paper submissions from HK$5 to
HK$13 ($1.70) each, whereas electronic transactions were reduced from HK$5 to
HK$0.50. This generated savings of HK$6.9 million ($0.9 million) per annum for ex-
port license transactions alone. With respect to trade declarations, the anticipated
savings on 15 million declarations per annum would amount to HK$22.5 million
($3 million).
Competitive entrenchment for subscriber companies can be achieved through
several means, such as improved efficiency, cost reduction, extension of global
reach, and perhaps more important, interconnectivity with other e-commerce ser-
vice providers, clients, customers, and suppliers. In 1999 and 2000, Tradelink con-
tacted a small random sample of subscribers to find out whether there were any
savings or improvements in business efficiency having adopted the electronic sys-
tem. Its findings are summarized in Table 2. Quantifiable savings include reduced
staffing costs and reduced document processing time.
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Figure 2. The electronic delivery of trade documents through the Tradelink network.
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Table 2
Reported Savings and Improvements by a Sample of Tradelink Subscribers
Company Size No. of Documents Submitted Savings/Improvements
Pak Tak Knitting &
Garment Factory
5000+a 20 to 30 customs
declarations per day,
plus quota licenses,




Tec-Hill Company $150 millon
annual
sales
Not available Notable improvements in
employees’ work attitudes and
job satisfaction; trade document
submission processing staff
reduced from 3 to 1; using
TradeCard service has improved
profits  by 20%
E-Shing Embroidery
& Garment Factory
400+a Up to 200 quota licenses
per month
Convenience and improved
efficiency; saved the cost of
employing one messenger







350+a 200+ customs declarations
per day
Document processing time has
been reduced to as little as 20 s
per document
Starlight International 8000+a Hundreds of customs
declarations per day
Full time shipping staff reduced
from 9 to 5
Seiko Instruments (HK) 5700a 1,000-1,500 customs
declarations per month
Full time shipping staff reduced
from 5 to 3; Improved job
satisfaction of sales and services
team




per day; plus certificates
of origin
Document processing speed has
improved by 1.5 times; trade
document submission
processing staff reduced from 5
to 2
TAL Apparel 16 000+a Not available Trade document submission
processing staff reduced from 2
to less than 1 full time staff;
significantly reduced the




14 7000a Not available Trade document submission








Saves time and cost of a courier
aNumber of employees.
3. A COMPARISON OF TRADELINK AND TRADENET
The successful and speedy development and implementation of TradeNet, the Sin-
gapore equivalent of Tradelink, has often been charted as a model case for building
national information infrastructure. However, the size and complexity of the
Tradelink system has been understated, and the approaches of the two govern-
ments to achieving a national competitive advantage have been quite different.
These differences are discussed under the headings of idea origination, ownership
of the systems, development, implementation, and competitive entrenchment.
3.1 Idea Origination
The idea for TradeNet originated in the 1980s when the Committee on National
Computerization (CNC) was commissioned by the Singapore government to make
recommendations on how the island state could make use of IT. The CNC report
concluded that Singapore should pursue a world leadership role in the use of IT.
With this, the NCB was established under the Ministry of Finance to develop pro-
grams for building an IT society. TradeNet was one of these programs. The primary
objective was for TradeNet to cut costs and speed up the turnaround time for trade
and customs documentation. The government felt sure that without public section
push, the project would not materialize. The Trade Development Board (TDB) was
charged with coordinating and bringing together all the parties involved in trade,
particularly the government bodies. Consensus was reached among all parties that
an electronic trading system would be beneficial for ensuring Singapore’s future
competitiveness.
The initiation of the TradeNet system and the Tradelink system were markedly
different. The Singapore government was the driving force of TradeNet, whereas
the Hong Kong government left it to the private sector to create the demand for an
electronic trading system.
3.2 Ownership of the Systems
TDB, the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, the Port of Singapore Authority,
and Singapore Telecom—all quasi-government organizations and the key players
in the project—decided that SNS be formed to own and operate the TradeNet sys-
tem. Pearleen Chan, former deputy general manager and head of the Government
Computerization Project at NCB, was appointed chief executive officer of SNS. The
shareholders of the company are the same four quasi-government agencies, the
TDB being the major shareholder with 55%.
By comparison, Tradelink is owned by a consortium of organizations that are
major players in the private sector. The Hong Kong government increased its
shareholding in the company from 10% to 45%, thus demonstrating the govern-
ment’s increasing awareness of the significance of the project for Hong Kong’s
competitiveness. It was during the development stage in 1996 that a former gov-
ernment official was hired to manage the company. Furthermore, management
and operation of the system has been conferred on Tradelink by way of a franchise
agreement with a term of 7 years.
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3.3 Development
A TradeNet steering committee was formed to oversee 3 subcommittees that coor-
dinated activities among the maritime community, the air community, and the gov-
ernment bodies during the systems development stage. The reports of the 3 sub-
committees formed the blueprint for the TradeNet system. The mandate was for the
system to be operational by early 1989.
As for systems development, the task was simplified by the fact that IBM© al-
ready had an internal EDI system in place located in Florida, which was relocated
to Singapore and modified to form the TradeNet system. The original system had
1.25 million lines of assembly code, of which 3000 were altered in the modification
process. Other components of the system were written within 6 months. The total
cost of the system has been estimated at $33 million. Decisions were made quickly
that reflected the consensus and commitment of all the main players in the project,
not least that of the government. In fact, Pearleen Chan commented that the project
would not have succeeded without the initial Government Computerization Pro-
ject and the various computer systems that were in place in the government depart-
ments and agencies, which had simply to be hooked onto the TradeNet system [14].
Tradelink, on the other hand, took 9 years from 1988 when the government de-
cided to acquire 10% stake in the company, to 1997 when the first electronic service
was launched, to develop its core system. However, the project was much more
complex than TradeNet in that the system was developed from scratch and for a
wider user base.
3.4 Implementation
In terms of setting closure dates for paper document submissions, time scales for
profit generation, formulating incentive schemes for SMEs, and modeling the
hub-and-spokes configuration for nonadopters, the two systems were very similar.
TradeNet was launched on January 1, 1989 as the first nationwide EDI trading sys-
temintheworld.Bytheendof theyear,nearlyhalfof thetradedocuments forseaand
air shipments were handled by TradeNet. The date set for the mandatory use of elec-
tronic submissions was brought forward to early 1991. By the 2nd year of operation,
SNS was generating revenues from subscription and usage fees that exceeded its op-
erating costs. In Singapore, SMEs were offered tax write-offs for the purchase of
hardware, whereas in Hong Kong incentives to encourage SME adoption were de-
signed by Tradelink without government aid. Those who do not subscribe to the net-
workhavethechoiceof lodgingtradedocumentsatservicecentersorTDBoffices.
Tradelink and TradeNet operates on both Windows© and the Internet platform.
Similar and significant cost and time savings have been reported by users of both
systems.
Today Singapore is the 16th largest trading nation in the world (compared to
Hong Kong’s 10th position), with total trade volume exceeding $90 billion.
TradeNet processes around one half million trade declarations a month, covering a
user base of about 2600 subscribers. These are small figures when compared to
Tradelink’s average monthly trade declaration submissions of over 1.3 million, and
a user base of over 51 000.
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3.5 Competitive Entrenchment
Both Tradelink and TradeNet have been quick to leverage their respective networks
to support a wider community of users, thus extending their services beyond gov-
ernment related trade documents. However, the focus and strategy of both have
been different.
Since TradeNet was launched, the government has used it as the springboard
for further building the national information infrastructure. Through partner-
ships with various government departments and industry associations, SNS has
developed systems and networks that provide electronic services for entire com-
munities of users, such as MediNet for linking hospitals, clinics, drug and equip-
ment stores, the Ministry of Health, and the Central Provident Fund. Within a
short space of 3 years, the network of users was extended to include over 30 pub-
lic-sector organizations and 2200 commercial organizations. Singapore’s holistic
strategy for building a technology-driven “intelligent island” was government
driven and managed.
Tradelink has focused firmly on extending its network to user communities
along the supply chain, leaving the sociological electronic infrastructure to the gov-
ernment. With the expiration of the franchise in 2003, Tradelink’s plan was to de-
velop a viable business that would satisfy its shareholders and customers. The
government has played a minor role beyond agreeing the systems and services
linking traders to the various government departments.
Although the Hong Kong and Singapore approaches have been significantly
different through the stages of conception to development to implementation to
operation, the outcome of both have been to build ecosystems that provide the ba-
sis for national, regional, and global interconnectivity.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This study highlights an approach to government involvement in e-commerce and
NII development projects that impinge on national competitiveness. It took
Tradelink over 10 years to bring together the centerpiece of e-commerce to a busi-
ness community consisting of mainly small- and medium-sized trading companies.
Its experience serves to highlight a number of issues: the significance of government
involvement in projects of this nature; the balance between the public and private
sectors’ involvement, which would create the most favorable environment for
adoption and use; and the various ways in which the government and Tradelink
can influence adoption.
The interaction between the public and private sectors throughout the project
draws attention to the need for a form of partnership to create the dynamics of sup-
ply-push and demand-pull forces for projects of this nature to succeed. Without
government intervention, especially in creating the initial supply push, market
forces would seem to fail to achieve the framework required for leveraging na-
tional goals. Through comparison of Tradelink and TradeNet, we can identify how
the two different approaches both require, to a greater or lesser degree, some form
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of government involvement. In Singapore, the transformation has been much more
holistic given that the government orchestrated and took ownership of the project
at the outset. In Hong Kong, the government gave the initial push, leaving
Tradelink to carve out for itself a viable business strategy for the future.
The government’s involvement in the 3 stages of the project serves to highlight
certain appropriate modes of influence and regulation. At the development stage,
government direction and support are essential, not only to create the push in re-
search and development, but also in reassuring the private sector of the signifi-
cance of e-commerce and NII for competing globally. At the early stage it is also
necessary for the government to establish the technical standards on which devel-
opments are to follow.
At the implementation stage, a major factor that encourages demand pull in the
private sector is the government’s stipulation that the appropriate government de-
partments would take the first step in adopting the innovative services. Capturing
the government’s commitment ensures consistency in technical developments of a
coherent system, setting standards on which other e-commerce and EDI services
would be developed and integrated. Government commitment to certain stan-
dards, such as language and security protocols, is also imperative for enticing user
trust. Without a robust regulatory framework, trust—a prerequisite for mass adop-
tion—cannot be achieved.
The third stage, which we have called competitive entrenchment, sees the emer-
gence of a new global business ecosystem where business transactions across cor-
porate, industry, and national boundaries are conducted with an increasing degree
of speed, openness, and transparency. The government’s involvement at this stage
is minimal as the network of systems finds new strength by extending beyond gov-
ernment trade-related documentation. The success of companies in the future will
largely depend on their ability to leverage the existing and new technological infra-
structure to find new ways of cooperating with their partners to provide customers
with a wide range of related, value-added services [30].
The adoption of e-commerce will increasingly affect the ability of service econo-
mies to compete in the global marketplace. As markets are becoming more interde-
pendent, the effective management of the entire supply and demand chains will
lead to more efficient trade among nations. As such, the coordinating role of the
global trading hubs becomes significant in trade facilitation, both regionally and
internationally. In today’s global marketplace, supply and demand are matched
from different corners of the world. Having the right infrastructure in place creates
the necessary platform for competitiveness, allowing the business community to
overcome trade barriers and reach new markets. The economy that stands to gain
the most is one that uses such infrastructure to minimize costs and shorten time,
thus providing value to the customer.
In recent years, governments and organizations such as Tradelink and the
Pan-Asia E-Commerce Alliance have been working together to agree on a set of
guidelinesandregulationstominimizethevariances instandardsandregulationsof
the different nations, thus removing the barriers to building a global ecosystem [31].
The role of governments in mapping out the regulations that will govern this new
ecosystem will likely increase, and further research in this area will be necessary.
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